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ARGUMENT 
The Analysis In Berry Is Fully Applicable to Burgandy's Appeal 
The state begins its response by asserting that the analysis 
employed in Berry By And Through Berry v. Beech Aircraftf 717 
P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) is inapplicable to Burgandy's case, because 
the statute in question does not "abrogate" his right of access 
to the courts. Brief of Appellee, at 13. It rejects the tests 
established in Berry and says that the "[p]roper inquiry is 
whether the potential repayment of benefits received pending an 
unsuccessful eligibility challenge unreasonably bars judicial 
access." (emphasis added). Brief of the Appellee, at 13. The 
state seems to be reading Berry as applying only to statutes 
which totally eliminate access to the courts or which place a 
time limit on access, such as a statute of limitations or repose. 
But the state offers nothing from Berry or other case law to 
support its narrow interpretation. Berry did not involve a 
statute that eliminated entirely a remedy or cause of action; the 
statute in Berry simply limited the time in which a remedy could 
be sought. A statute which chills or burdens a GA recipient's 
right to a pretermination hearing does not eliminate a remedy 
entirely but it does limit it. 
While admittedly no case has yet applied Berry to facts 
similar to those raised in this appeal, the state's conclusion 
that Berry is only relevant to the review of statutes which 
"abrogate" or "bar" a citizen's right of access to the courts is 
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not supported by the case law. In Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 
1357, 1361 (Utah App. 1993), this court addressed whether the 
protective scope of the open courts provision should be limited 
to invalidating statutes of repose. The court concluded it 
should not, pointing out: 
The supreme court views section 11 as having 
potentially broad application. Horton, 785 
P.2d at 1093. The open courts provision is 
not primarily concerned with particular, 
identifiable causes of action, but rather 
with the availability of legal remedies to 
vindicate individuals' interest "in the 
integrity of their persons, property and 
reputations.1 Berry, 111 P.2d at 677 n. 4. 
Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d at 1361. 
The court went on to highlight those principles in Berry 
which support a broad application of the open courts provision. 
It noted that this provision: 
guarantees "access to the courts and a 
judicial procedure that is based on fairness 
and equality,' and prevents arbitrary 
deprivation of "effective remedies designed 
to protect basic individual rights.1 
Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d at 1361, quoting Berry, 111 P.2d at 
675. Moreover, this court noted: 
[SJection 11 imposes limits on the 
legislature for the protection of injured 
persons who are isolated in society and 
lacking political influence. Berry, 111 P.2d 
at 676; Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 367 
(Zimmerman, J., concurring). 
Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d at 1361. 
The state makes passing reference to these principles in its 
brief, but fails to come to grips with their meaning in the 
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context of this appeal. A fundamental difference between 
Burgandy and the state is that Burgandy regards GA recipients as 
precisely the category of individuals which the Supreme Court 
deemed in need of protection under the open courts provision. 
When a fundamental right is involved, such as the right to a 
pretermination hearing, the case deserves the same careful 
scrutiny as was afforded a prisoner seeking habeas corpus review 
in Currierf a case which the state barely acknowledges. 
The state's failure to take to heart the principles 
established in Berry influences other statements it makes in its 
brief. Having rejected Berry, the state gives short shrift to a 
reasonable alternative patterned on the Social Security 
Administration policy for waiving overpayments of this type. The 
state rejects the suggestion and responds that the reasonable 
alternatives suggested "represent decisions to be made in the 
legislative and policy-making arenas." Brief of Appellee, at 19. 
However, Burgandy and other GA recipients are precisely the kind 
of individuals who are incapable of influencing the political 
process to bring about such changes. For that very reason, they 
need the protection of the open courts provision. 
The state wrongly suggests that GA recipients are able to 
receive all the relief they need through the administrative 
process. While a GA recipient facing termination may seek review 
in the administrative system, and eventually in the courts if 
necessary, the suggestion begs the question raised by this 
appeal—whether applying the statute to permit recovery of an 
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overpayment chills or burdens a GA recipient's right to a 
pretermination hearing. 
The state's assurance at page 12 of its brief that GA 
recipients assessed an overpayment for continued benefits are 
provided "an effective and reasonable remedy for challenging the 
establishment and collection of overpayments" is false and 
misleading. Other than the protection sought by this appeal 
under the Utah Constitutionf there is no effective means of 
challenging the atypical overpayment at issue in this case. 
Burgandy's case is evidence of that. To exhaust his 
administrative remedies, Burgandy requested review of the 
overpayment but there were no factual or legal issues in dispute. 
R-68-70. Unlike an overpayment alleged on the basis of mistake, 
fraud or administrative error, which can be challenged through a 
hearing, administrative review of continued benefits overpayments 
is meaningless. 
Burgandy's Case Is Not Controlled By The Jensen Decision 
Having concluded that Berry is inapplicable because the 
statute at issue does not bar or abrogate access to the courts, 
the state redefines the issue at page 17 of its brief. There, 
the state says the issue to be addressed by the court is: 
"whether the possibility of repayment of continued benefits 
unreasonably burdens access to judicial review." (Emphasis 
added) Brief of Appellee, at 17. Although it acknowledges that 
the burdening of Burgandy's right to a constitutionally 
established pretermination hearing is the issue, the state fails 
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to offer convincing argument that the burden imposed is 
reasonable. Instead, the state likens the burden on Burgandy*s 
constitutional pretermination hearing right to that of a 
prepayment of a tax deficiency and concludes thatf because access 
to the courts is not completely barred, it is reasonable. 
The state's reliance on Jensen v. Utah State Tax Comm'n., 
835 P.2d 965 (Utah 1992) and cases following itf to support its 
reasonable burden argument is misplaced. Although the state 
acknowledges some ambivalence in comparing Burgandy to Jensen--
("[ajdmittedly Burgandy1s situation differs from that of these 
other plaintiffs." Brief of Appellee, at 16)--it fails to come 
to grips with the many differences between Burgandy1s appeal and 
Jensen. Instead, the state offers conclusory statements without 
ever grappling with the significant differences. 
The state overlooks the nature of the right involved. 
Jensen did not involve a fundamental individual right. The 
state ignores the general principle stated in Currier v. Holden, 
862 P.2d at 1364, that stricter scrutiny will be given to 
measures that impinge upon civil liberties than those which 
curtail what might be called "economic interests." Brief of 
Appellant, at 16-17. The state acknowledges the constitutional 
right of a GA recipient under Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 
261, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970) to a pretermination 
hearing but fails to show how the interest at stake is the same 
as that in Jensen. Hansen v. Wilkinson, 889 P.2d 927 (Utah App. 
1995) probably comes closest to Burgandy1s case, since it 
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involved the constitutional right to petition for habeas corpus, 
but even there the facts are readily distinguishable. In Hansen, 
a prisoner's exercise of his habeas corpus right was not 
affected, since he had adequate resources for paying a filing 
fee. 
The state also ignores significant factual differences 
between Burgandy's case and Jensen. In both Jensen and Maryboy 
v. Utah State Tax Comm., 904 P.2d 662 (Utah 1995) the issue could 
be resolved through an objective determination of financial 
means, using quantifiable variables at the start of the appeal 
process. The same cannot be said of GA recipients who do not 
know in advance the precise amount of the overpayment they may 
have to repay. Lacking legal representation, many GA recipients 
are unable to assess the likelihood of success at a hearing and 
calculate the amount of overpayment that will likely accrue. 
Without a vigorous advocate, a GA recipient can do little to 
expedite the process and thereby lessen the amount of a possible 
overpayment. 
Given the unique vulnerability of many GA recipients, their 
lack of knowledge and the uncertainty of the amount which may 
have to be repaid, some GA recipients, out of fear and 
frustration, will likely forego a hearing entirely, choosing to 
return to homelessness and reliance on the community for support. 
Some of those deterred from seeking a pretermination hearing may 
not have meritorious cases, but some will. The arbitrariness 
lies in the fact that both are deterred. 
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It is not a sufficient answer to say that a GA recipient may 
avoid a possible overpayment by not requesting continuing 
benefits. Goldberg v. Kelly establishes that GA benefits cannot 
be terminated until a hearing is held. It cannot be determined 
that a GA recipient is ineligible until a hearing is held; in the 
meantime, GA recipients with meritorious cases and those with 
nonmeritorious cases will both be denied benefits. Payment of 
benefits retroactively to those cases found to be meritorious 
does not lessen the burden, since the recipient was effectively 
terminated prior to a hearing and suffered the loss of benefits 
while waiting for his "pretermination hearing." The burden of 
being without benefits is substituted for the burden of a 
possible overpayment—both effects impinge upon a 
constitutionally protected interest. 
The State Has Ignored Relevant Case Law Cited By Appellant 
In arguing that there is no unreasonable denial of access to 
the courts, the state tries to distinguish Silver v. Cormier, 529 
F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1976), because it involved the threatened 
withholding of monies due and owing. The state agrees that "a 
threat to hold back money which is legally due and owing would be 
a bar to accessing the courts." Brief of Appellee, at 18. The 
state, however, ignores case law holding that it makes no 
difference whether the claimant was entitled to the benefits in 
question. McCoy v. Goldinf 598 F.Supp. 310, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 
1984)(discussed in Brief of Appellant, at 14-15). McCoy relied, 
in part, on Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 
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33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972) which held: 
For at least a quarter-century, this 
Court has made clear that even though a 
person has no "right* to a valuable 
governmental benefit and even though the 
government may deny him the benefit for any 
number of reasons, there are some reasons 
upon which the government may not rely. It 
may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis 
that infringes his constitutionally protected 
interests... 
The state declines to address the holdings of these cases in its 
responding brief. 
The state goes on to argue that it is "illogical" not to 
recover benefits from a GA recipient once he is determined 
ineligible. Brief of Appellee, at 19. However, as the United 
States Supreme Court has made clear, there are circumstances 
where a benefit cannot be denied. The fundamental weakness in 
the state's analysis is its failure to take seriously the right 
to a pretermination hearing established in Goldberg v. Kelly. 
That case determined that a GA recipient remains eligible for 
benefits until a pretermination hearing. A determination by the 
state that someone receiving GA has improved and is no longer 
eligible is not the same as an initial determination of 
eligibility. Burgandy and other similarly situated recipients 
have been found eligible for benefits. They remain presumptively 
eligible until determined ineligible at a hearing. The state's 
initial finding of ineligibility is not final. If a GA recipient 
remains eligible until a pretermination hearing is held, then it 
cannot later be said that the recipient was ineligible and, thus, 
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overpaid. 
The state is also incorrect in its broad conclusion that 
there is no support in "Utah constitutional provisions, statutes 
or case law" for providing benefits to someone regardless of 
eligibility. Brief of Appellee, at 19. One area the state 
overlooks is equitable estoppel. A number of Utah cases have 
held that equitable estoppel may be invoked under certain 
circumstances against a governmental entity, including the Utah 
State Department of Social Services. Mendez v. State Dept. Of 
Social Services, 813 P.2d 1234, 1236 (Utah App. 1991). In such 
cases, a recipient may have been ineligible for a benefit but, 
because of misrepresentation by the government entity, repayment 
cannot be required. When Mendez was remanded, the state dropped 
its claim against him. Moreover, the state routinely declines 
collection of overpayments where it is determined at a hearing 
that the overpayment was caused by agency error. It is 
misleading to suggest, as the state does, that to accept 
Burgandy's argument "would require the state to provide benefits 
to a recipient regardless of eligibility." Brief of Appellee, at 
18-19. 
Finally, the state questions, although it does not directly 
challenge, the availability of the open courts provision to a 
case originating at the administrative level. Brief of Appellee, 
at 11. Although the issue has not been addressed in Utah case 
law, at least one other state, applying a similar open courts 
provision, has held it applicable at the administrative level. 
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State ex, rel, Stephan v, O'Keefe, 686 P.2d 171, 178 (Kan. 1984), 
cert denied, 469 U.S. 1088 (1984). Brief of Appellant, at 10. 
In this case, Burgandy claims the protection of the open courts 
provision at the administrative level, since a GA recipient must 
exhaust administrative remedies before petitioning for review in 
district court under Utah Code Annot. § 63-46b-15. The 
administrative hearing is the gateway to the judicial system; a 
GA recipient deterred from requesting a pretermination hearing 
cannot gain access to the courts. 
CONCLUSION 
The state looks at the facts presented in Burgandy's appeal 
with sharp hindsight. It prefers to focus on the fact that 
Burgandy was determined ineligible for GA, since that focus 
allows it to ignore the impact of the statute on Burgandy1s 
constitutionally protected right to a pretermination hearing. 
The court can insure the validity of that right by holding that 
the statute in question is unconstitutional as applied. The 
court should reverse the lower court and order that the 
overpayment may not be recovered. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of March, 1999. 
<r Michael E. Bulson 
Attorney for Appellant 
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